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InZero provides some security

I was just made aware of InZero, a new physical device that you connect to your PC, and your browsing becomes secure. I find it amazing that some people treat it as among the most revolutionary of security solutions.

I think the InZero device is cool. I think it protects against
some attack vectors, at some usability costs. It may even make a worthwhile trade-off for some people. But to consider the protection granted by this device as something that is revolutionary, or to claim that it is “giving hackers, criminals, and spies the middle finger” is an exaggeration, even when it comes from marketing guys.

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Right, the kernel can access your encrypted volume keys. So what?

On January 15th, TechWorld published an article called Encryption programs open to kernel hack. Essentially, it warns that the key to encrypted volumes, that is, to volumes of software-encrypted virtual drives, is delivered by the encryption application to the kernel of the operating system, and thus may be captured by a malicious kernel.

According to a paper […] such OTFE (on-the-fly-encryption) programs typically pass the password and file path information in the clear to a device driver through a Windows programming function called ‘DevicelOControl’.”


And they consider it as a threat:

Dubbed, the Mount IOCTL (input output control) Attack by Roellgen, an attacker would need to substitute a modified version of the DevicelOControl function that is part of the kernel with one able to log I/O control codes in order to find the one used by an encryption driver. Once found, the plaintext passphrase used to encrypt and decrypt a mounted volume would be vulnerable.”


Such “findings” occur often when the security model of a security system is ignored.

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Firewire threat to FDE

Full-Disk Encryption (FDE) suffers class attacks lately.

As if the latest research (which showed that RAM contents can be recovered after power-down) was not enough, it seems as Firewire ports can form yet an easier attack vector into FDE-locked laptops.

From TechWorld: Windows hacked in seconds via Firewire

The attack takes advantage of the fact that Firewire can directly read and write to a system’s memory, adding extra speed to data transfer.


The tool mentioned seems to only bypass the Win32 unlock screen, but given the free access to RAM, exploit code that digs out FDE keys is a matter of very little extra work.

This is nothing new. The concept was presented a couple of years ago, but I haven’t seen most FDE enthusiasts disable their Firewire ports yet.

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